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Abstract
In this paper we discuss the shift from a legal to an interactionist view
on normative multiagent systems, examples, and ten new challenges in
this more dynamic setting.
1 Towards a more dynamic interactionist view
Traditionally normative systems have been studied in philosophy, sociology, law,
and ethics, and during the past two decades they have been studied in deontic
logic in computer science (∆EON). Normative multiagent systems is a research
area where the traditional normative systems and ∆EON research fields meet
agent research. The proposed solutions to the ∆EON research problems are
changing, and solutions based on multiagent systems are increasing. Gradually
∗This paper appeared as the editorial [4].
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the ∆EON research focus changes from logical relations among norms, to, for
example, agent decision making, and to systems in which norms are created
and in which agents can play the role of legislators. The eighth conference on
Deontic Logic in Computer Science in 2006 in Utrecht, the Netherlands had as
special focus “artificial normative systems” [12, 11], and the seventh conference
[15, 16] in 2004 in Madeira, Portugal had as special theme “deontic logic and
multiagent systems.” Continuing this trend, the third workshop on normative
multiagent systems is co-located in Luxembourg in July 2008 with the ninth
conference on Deontic Logic in Computer Science [12, 24], which has as special
topic “security and trust,” and the fourth workshop will again be a Dagstuhl
seminar to be held in March 2009.
The Agentlink Roadmap [17, Fig. 7.1.] observes that norms must be in-
troduced in agent technology in the medium term for infrastructure for open
communities, reasoning in open environments and trust and reputation. After
four days of discussion, the participants of the second workshop on normative
multiagent systems agreed to the following consensus definition:
“A normative multiagent system is a multiagent system organized by means
of mechanisms to represent, communicate, distribute, detect, create, mod-
ify, and enforce norms, and mechanisms to deliberate about norms and
detect norm violation and fulfilment.”
The shift towards a more dynamic interactionist view on normative multi-
agent systems is reflected in the way this definition builds on its predecessor
which emerged at the first workshop on normative multiagent systems held in
2005 as a symposium of the Artificial Intelligence and Simulation of Behaviour
convention (AISB) in Hatfield, United Kingdom: “A normative multiagent sys-
tem is a multiagent system together with normative systems in which agents
on the one hand can decide whether to follow the explicitly represented norms,
and on the other the normative systems specify how and in which extent the
agents can modify the norms” [3]. The emphasis has shifted from representa-
tion issues to the mechanisms used by agents to coordinate themselves, and in
general to organize the multiagent system. Norms are communicated, for exam-
ple, since agents in open systems can join a multiagent system whose norms are
not known. Norms are distributed among agents, for example, since when new
norms emerge the agent could find a new coalition to achieve its goals. Norm
violations and norm compliance are detected, for example, since spontaneous
emergence norms of among agents implies that norm enforcement cannot be
delegated to the multiagent infrastructure.
This shift of interest marks the passage of focus from the more static le-
galistic view of norms (where power structures are fixed) to the more dynamic
interactionist view of norms (where agent interaction is the base for norm re-
lated regulation. This ties in to what Strauss [21] called “negotiated order”,
Goffmans [13] view on institutions, and Giddens’ [10] structuration theory).
The workshop vote on next generation scenarios for normative multiagent sys-
tems clearly preferred social scenarios like virtual communities and Second Life
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(over 50%) to more classical e-commerce settings where centralized solutions
like e-institutions are used (less than 20%).
The legalistic view of normative multiagent systems is a top-down view which
considers the normative system as a regulatory instrument to regulate
emerging behavior of open systems without enforcing the desired behav-
ior. Agents are often motivated by sanctions to stick to norms, rather than
by their sharing of the norms. Even if agents are allowed some freedom to
create norms, this freedom is mostly restricted to the possibility for agents
to create contracts to regulate the interaction among them.
The interactionist view on normative multiagent systems represents a bottom-
up view. In this autonomous individually oriented view norms can be seen,
e.g., as regularities of behavior which emerge without any enforcement sys-
tem because agents conform to them either because their goals happen to
coincide, or because they feel themselves as part of the group or because
they share the same values of other agents. Sanctions are not always neces-
sary, where by sanctions we mean formal measures towards norm violating
agents carried out by agents whose task it is to sanction norm violations,
because social blame and spontaneous exclusion of non-conforming agents
are often enough. This interactionist view, which has been promoted in
the multiagent systems community by Cristiano Castelfranchi [8], becomes
essential in applications related to virtual communities. In Second Life,
for example, communities emerge in which the behavior of its members
show increasing homogeneity.
To put this shift from legal to interactionist view into perspective, we can
identify five levels in the development of normative multiagent systems. At
level 1 of off-line norm design [20], norms are imposed by the designer and
automatically enforced, and agents cannot organize themselves by means of
norms. At level 2 of norm representation, norms are explicitly represented,
they can be used in agent communication and negotiation, and a simple kind of
organizations and institutions can be created. At level 3 of norm manipulation,
a legal reality is created in which agents can add and remove norms following the
rules of the normative system. Whereas existing normative multiagent systems
are still at one of these first three levels of norm autonomy (for an introduction
to norm autonomy in multiagent systems, see [25]), multiagent system research
is now moving to level 4 of social reality, and is concerned with the ten challenges
discussed in Section 3 below. We believe that there is at least one more level to
be dealt with in the future. At level 5, the norms create a new moral reality.
This goes beyond present studies in machine ethics [1], which is more concerned
with agent decision making in the context of norms, which is an issue dealt with
at each level of normative multiagent systems, than with creating a new ethics.
Clearly, for each level the development of the normative multiagent system
will take a much larger effort than the development of similar systems at lower
levels. For example, if norm are explicitly represented (level 2) rather than built
into the system (level 1), then the system has to be much more flexible to deal
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with the variety of normative systems that may emerge. However, it may be
expected that normative multiagent systems realized at higher levels will have
a huge effect on social interaction, in particular on the web. In the following
sections, we discuss some examples and several research needs that arise in this
more dynamic interactionist view on normative multiagent systems.
2 Examples of an interactionist view
We illustrate the more dynamic interactionist viewpoint on normative multia-
gent systems using virtual communities in virtual reality settings like Second
Life. In these virtual communities, human agents interact with artificial agents
in a virtual world. The new communication instruments offered by the internet
have resulted in the creation of virtual communities of users sharing information,
emotions, or hobbies. When the interaction possibilities are multiplied in appli-
cations like Second Life or multi-player online games, new scenarios emerge. In
particular, given the higher degree of freedom of behavior with respect to the
real world, and the unaccountability offered by anonymity, on the one hand,
as said above, spontaneous communities emerge showing regularities of behav-
ior. However, to preserve the autonomy of the members of these communities,
interactionist mechanisms for regulating behavior are needed. Thus, members
of communities should be endowed with tools to make the community norms
explicit and communicable to preserve their members’ autonomy.
The participants will eventually end up creating their own norms and rules,
even if in virtual communities like Second Life and in multi-player games nor-
mative infrastructure is imposed by the designers. Sometimes, the rules created
by the participants counter the designers’ objectives and rules and players start
to play in ways unforeseen by the game designers. An example is discussed by
Peter Ludlow [18] from Sony’s EverQuest. EverQuest is a multiplayer online
game where gamers are supposed to fight each other in a world of snakes, drag-
ons, gods, and the Sleeper. Sony intended the Sleeper to be unkillable and gave
it extreme high hit points. However, a combined combat of close to 200 players
nearly succeeded to kill the ’animal’. Unfortunately, Sony decided to intervene
and rescue the monster. Most of the discussion on this example has highlighted
the decrease in trust of the game players in Sony, despite the fact that the next
day Sony let the game players beat the Sleeper. However, in this paper we
would like to highlight what this story tells us about the goals of game players,
and its consequences for necessary technology in games. The following quote
illustrates the excitement in killing the Sleeper.
A supposedly [player-vs.-player] server banded together 200 people.
The chat channels across the server were ablaze, as no less than
5,000 of us listened in, with OMG theyre attempting the Sleeper!
Good luck d00dz! Everyone clustered near their screens, sharing the
thrill of the fight, the nobility of the attempt and the courage of those
brave 200. Play slowed to a crawl on every server as whispers turned
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to shouts, as naysayers predicted, It can’t be done or It will drop
a rusty level 1 sword and most of us just held our breath, silently
urging them forward. Rumors abounded: If they win, the whole EQ
world stops and you get the text from the end of Wizardry 1, or If
they win, the president of Sony will log on and congratulate them.
With thousands watching and waiting, the Sleepers health inched
ever downward.
. . .
[EverQuest player] Ghenwivar writes, On Monday, November 17th,
in the most amazing and exciting battle ever, [EverQuest guilds]
Ascending Dawn, Wudan and Magus Imperialis Magicus defeated
Kerafyrm, also known as The Sleeper, for the first time ever on an
EverQuest server. The fight lasted approximately three hours and
about 170180 players from [EverQuest server] Rallos Zeks top three
guilds were involved. Hats off to everyone who made this possible
and put aside their differences in order to accomplish the impossible.
Congratulations RZ!!!” [18]
Normative multiagent systems study multiagent technology to support the
emergent cooperation in online multi-player games like EverQuest [2]. The ex-
ample illustrates that the game had been so well wrought that a real coalition of
communities of players had formed, one that was able to set aside the differences
between the communities, at least for a night, in pursuit of a common goal. This
was not intended or foreseen by Sony, and getting two hundred people to focus
on accomplishing the same task is a challenge.
“Why, you might ask, would anyone waste four hours of their life
doing this? Because a game said it couldn’t be done.
This is like the Quake freaks that fire their rocket launchers at their
own feet to propel themselves up so they can jump straight to the
exit and skip 90% of the level and finish in 2 seconds. Someone
probably told them they couldn’t finish in less than a minute.
Games are about challenges, about hurdles or puzzles or fights over-
come. To some players, the biggest hurdle or challenge is how to do
what you (the designer) said couldn’t happen. If you are making a
game, accept this.” [18]
A typical problem in virtual communities is caused by the ease in which new
participants can enter the community, known as “newbies”. The virtual commu-
nities should be able to defend itself from dangerous new players, and normative
systems are a way to pose virtual gates to such communities. “Griefers would
also maintain numerous alts that were sent out into greater Alphaville in at-
tempts to scam and disrupt other houses. Because alts were usually abandoned
soon after they had been created, they appeared to others as new characters,
and this had the effect of making many players highly suspicious of newbies, and
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of generating virtual gated communities in response.” [18] However, a virtual
space should be able to deal with honest new participants. It has been noted
that existing communities establish practices which tend to exclude newly en-
tered participant in the virtual space: “Processes of norm building were visible,
resulting in patterns of established users versus outsiders; new bonds were cre-
ated, and users experience an appropriation of this newly created virtual public
space: parts of the Digital City were ‘taken over’ by active established users
who behaved as a closed community and were perceived accordingly by the
outsiders.” [23]
As illustrated by the “newbies” example, there are some aspects in which
normative systems for virtual communities are more challenging than traditional
regulations. For example, the construction of autonomous virtual communities
cannot ground itself on an external legal system - apart from most serious cases
like frauds going beyond the virtual environment - as in e-commerce applications
that ground the validity of online contracts on the relevant human regulations.
Consequently, these normative systems should be developed separately, in the
same way as different national systems are created independently. Another is-
sue is related to the possibility to augment actions in virtual scenarios: in these
scenarios characters can be created with their own behavior that have more abil-
ities then humans in the real world (e.g., flying, walking through wall), objects
nor existing in reality, and even places. Moreover, the abilities of characters
are not only related to the ones of their players: e.g., an avatar in Second Life
entering a dancing room can acquire new dancing abilities which it did not have
before and will lose afterwards. Thus the autonomy of characters assumes new
dimensions.
3 Ten research challenges for the interactionist
view
For the ten challenges posed by the interactionist viewpoint, we take the per-
spective from an agent programmer, and consider which kinds of tools like pro-
gramming primitives, infrastructures, protocols, and mechanisms she needs to
deal with norms in the example scenario. Similar needs exist at the requirements
analysis level, or the design level, but we have chosen for the programming level
since it makes the discussion more concrete, and this level is often ignored when
norms are discussed. The list is not exhaustive, and there is some overlap be-
tween the challenges. Our aim is to illustrate the range of topics which have to
be studied, and we therefore do not attempt to be complete.
Challenge 1 Tools for agents supporting communities in their task of recogniz-
ing, creating, and communicating norms to agents.
Even if social norms emerge informally, e.g., when a community becomes
more complex and more open, an explicit representation of norms becomes nec-
essary. There are still numerous philosophical problems for the representation
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of norms, see, for example, [14]. However, the new problem is the role of the
agents and humans involved in the interaction with the multiagent system.
Challenge 2 Tools for agents to simplify normative systems, recognize when
norms have become redundant, and to remove norms.
Challenge 2 is the counterpart of Challenge 1, because the natural tendency
of overregulation creates the need for a counterbalance. Since all norms come
with a cost, for example to process them, to communicate them, to maintain
them, or to enforce them, norms should only be introduced when they are really
needed, and they should be removed as soon as they are no longer needed. For
example, when the number of violations is increasing, this is typically a case
where norms must be changed or removed, rather than where norm enforcement
has to be increased.
Challenge 3 Tools for agents to enforce norms.
If we allow communities of agents to create their own normative multiagent
systems, then the issue of how to enforce the norms arises. In case a centralized
approach is needed, the infrastructure should support the enforcement of norms
created by the communities. In a distributed approach, roles should be defined
for agents in charge of monitoring and sanctioning. The virtual environment
can offer new opportunities for norm enforcement not found in the usual en-
vironments. For example, evidence about agent behaviors can be collected via
the logfiles of the system.
Challenge 4 Tools for agents to preserve their autonomy.
Challenge 4 is the counterpart of Challenge 3, because there is a natural
tendency to enforce norms by regimenting them into the system. The danger
highlighted by Castelfranchi [9] is related to the “formalization” of the informal.
Norms have the nature of general directives which cannot cover all cases nor
avoid all conflicts with other norms. Thus, normative multiagent systems need
to preserve the autonomy of agents regarding the making of decisions about
norm compliance and norm violation. Agents in charge of monitoring and en-
forcing norms should be flexible enough to preserve the autonomy of the “norm
subject” agents with respect to norm violations, for instance in circumstances
that differ from the circumstances which the norms have been defined to preserve
and where norm compliance is not advantageous for the normative multiagent
system.
Challenge 5 Tools for agents to construct organizations.
As the example about EverQuest example shows, cooperation among the
participants of virtual reality can result in coalitions which can achieve results
which go beyond the ones reachable by their members. This is of great interest
for participants in virtual reality, also because Second Life is becoming a place
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where business takes place. Thus, participants should be given some facilities
and tools which allow the construction and management of organizations to
achieve their goals. Note that in the real world such mechanisms exist, first of
all the laws which allow the creation of organizations and attribute the respon-
sibilities to different entities. E-institutions as proposed in multiagent systems
can be a starting point, but they are often too flat - i.e., not hierarchically
organized - and they usually do not support the dynamics of the underlying
normative systems by allowing the creation of new norms.
Challenge 6 Tools for agents to create intermediate concepts and normative
ontology, for example to decide about normative gaps.
In real institutions norms have a fuzzy character in the sense that they are
not able to cover all possible situations. In particular because new situations can
arise, e.g., due to technological advancement (for instance: is a digital signature
the same as an handwritten signature?) This problem increases exponentially
in virtual worlds where all kind of new behaviors and objects can be defined.
The solution in real normative system is to endow some agents with powers to
decide whether a new concept is subsumed by another one. The role of agents
in the logical reasoning of a normative system is something which is still missing
in the state of the art of the field.
Challenge 7 Tools for agents to decide about norm conflicts.
This challenge is related to Challenge 6 since norms do not cover all possible
cases and conflicts between norms are possible. Thus agents need a mechanism
to take decisions in situations of conflicting norms. The mechanism cannot
always be automated, for example because the degree of freedom in virtual
world to create new behaviors and objects norms may become underspecified.
Thus, the problem is to define normative systems, where, like in human norma-
tive systems, roles are defined and role keepers are empowered to take decision
when automated reasoning alone is not enough. At some point, the view of the
normative system as a self contained logical system is not viable anymore.
Challenge 8 Tools for agents to voluntarily give up some norm autonomy by
allowing automated norm processing in agent acting and decision making.
In many examples, the autonomy of the agent must be adjusted to the
context. In general avatars are graphical representations of users of a system
and can be seen as interface agents. Avatars living in Second life are interface
agents for human players but also increasingly for autonomous agents. Consider
the example above, where new abilities like dancing are automatically added to
the avatar. Moreover, even if now prohibited, autonomous agents should be
allowed to on the player’s behalf cope with events that occur when the player
is not online. It is possible to envisage a scenario where avatars are partially
programmed to take autonomous decisions when the player is off-line. Among
these decisions is whether to comply with norms of the community the avatar
is acting into.
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Note that these mechanisms are useful not only when the avatar is acting
autonomously on behalf of its off-line owner, but also during the activity of the
player. In real life norms are often violated just by distraction or ignorance
or by lack of resources and the violator does not gain anything by its deviant
behavior. The same will eventually happen in virtual worlds, especially when
norms to be respected will not be necessarily intuitive or similar to the ones
of real world. In these cases, the decision to conform to norms can be left to
the avatar and the player can be relieved from this task. E.g., consider the
case of communities where nudity of avatars is prohibited. The player could
simply leave to its avatar the burden to conform to the norms by automatically
disabling actions which are deviant with respect to the norms.
Challenge 9 Tools for conviviality.
Since scenarios like Second life are aiming at people having pleasant social
interactions, and norms may interfere with the goals of the players, the impact
of norms on this dimension must be considered. Norms should not constrain
the freedom of participants too much and allow to avoid unpleasant behavior
from other agents, but there is also a more subtle effect to be considered. Social
interaction is regulated by social conventions, which can be modeled as a sort
of institution. Part of the fun of “living” in Second life, like when participating
in a carnival or when embodying a character of a drama depends - according to
Taylor [22, 7] who calls this effect “conviviality” - is the temporary displacement
with respect to the usual norms of social life. In particular, in the sense that in
social relations the player acquires new social powers which he does not have in
his first life.
The tools for conviviality should study social dependencies among players
and indicate how these dependencies can be made less unbalanced by attribut-
ing more social powers to some players. Note that, as in the example about
automatic learning of dancing abilities in Section 2, adding social powers in a
virtual reality can take a more extended sense, since in the real world physical
abilities cannot be added. Tools for conviviality should also facilitate the intro-
duction of new participants in a virtual community by addressing the “newbies”
problems.
Challenge 10 Tools for legal responsibility of the agents and their principals.
Nowadays, agents become subjects of human legislation. For example, it
is debated if agents have responsibilities beyond the ones attributed to their
owner, or if agents can be really attributed mental states which are to be taken
into account in the attribution of responsibilities. However, in scenarios like
Second life, new questions arise. Participants accept the rules of the game and
they should be made aware whether following the rules of some communities
leads to infringement of real legislations.
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